Canadian Foreign Policy: Analysis and Evaluation

Canadian Forces College 2009-10
Elective
JCSP 36 – Canadian Foreign Policy: Analysis and Evaluation

Instructor: Adam Chapnick
Office: Curtis 316
Phone: 416-482-6800 ext 6853
Email: chapnick@cfc.dnd.ca
Class Size: ~ 8 participants.


Course Description

This course is designed to introduce students to the study of Canadian foreign policy. It uses history as a lens to assess contemporary issues and struggles. While the focus will be on defence and security issues, defined broadly, other aspects of the Canadian foreign policy agenda will be considered and discussed whenever appropriate. To understand the context of the foreign policy decisions taken in Canada, this course will consider both the domestic situation and politics abroad, with specific reference to the foreign policies of Canada’s most significant allies.

Seminars will be used to discuss and analyze the issues brought up in the weekly readings, to debate and evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of student action memoranda, and to apply the lessons of history to contemporary foreign policy themes.

Through these discussions, students will have the opportunity to develop their own ideas about the nature of the Canadian state and the Canadian foreign policy tradition. Students will be challenged to think critically about the nature of Canadian conduct in the international community and to develop their own individual interpretations of Canada’s evolving place in global politics.

Learning Objectives

C501a – analyse the theoretical underpinnings of strategic and national security-related concepts; state power and its usage; and approaches to the study of international relations.

C501b – compare and contrast the domestic and structural factors that influence Canadian governance, policymaking, and response mechanisms.

C501c – compare and contrast Canadian national security, foreign, defence, and development policies.

C501d – analyse the effects of emerging strategic issues, challenges and opportunities on Canadian foreign and defence policies.

C501f – analyse the international context (factors, actors, and systems) within which Canadian policies are generated and implemented.

Course Conduct

There is no core textbook for this course. Students who lack a background in the history of Canadian foreign policy are encouraged to consult Empire to Umpire by Norman Hillmer and Jack Granatstein or Alliance and Illusion by Robert Bothwell. Both are available in the IRC. Readings for each 3-hour seminar meeting are listed below along with the course schedule. Students are also expected to read at least 3 newspaper / journal articles per week on contemporary Canadian foreign policy issues (articles read for other JCSP courses are acceptable) from at least 2 different sources.

Seminars will be divided into three parts. The length of each part will vary depending on the number of presentations scheduled for the particular session. The first part will be an instructor-directed discussion based on the assigned historical readings. At the beginning of the second part, the students will receive at least one action memorandum relating to the historical topic of the day. They will be allotted no more than 15 minutes per memorandum to prepare their reaction. The author of the memorandum will be allotted 5-10 minutes to respond, and the subsequent discussion will be based on the strengths and weaknesses of the memorandum. The final part of the seminar will relate the themes of the historical discussion to contemporary Canadian foreign policy. The focus of this aspect of the seminar will change based on the issues of the day. list of questions with which students should aim to be comfortable during the discussion of the readings and action memoranda is included with this outline.

Assignments:

1. Seminar Participation (30%)

Active and consistent seminar participation is crucial to getting the most out of this course and therefore a very significant proportion of your final grade is reserved for your contribution to the small group discussions. Effective participation involves coming to class prepared (having done the readings carefully) and contributing to all three phases of the discussion in a meaningful and thoughtful manner. Dominating the seminar is frowned upon, and complete silence is also highly discouraged. Those who perform best in seminar direct their opinions to the entire group and incorporate the comments of others into their contributions; this is not the time to have a one-on-one discussion with your instructor. The CFC seminar participation rubric will be used to evaluate your contribution.

2. Action Memorandum Defence (10%)

This assignment tests students’ ability to organize their thoughts quickly and to respond effectively to criticisms of their own writing while under stress. After hearing comments from the rest of the class on their draft action memorandum, students will be given no more than a minute to organize their thoughts and provide a 5-10 minute response. The response may involve a 2-3 minute clarification of the author’s intent, but should focus on responding directly to the concerns of the student’s peers.

A draft version of the action memorandum is not to be distributed until the day of the relevant class. Students are strongly encouraged to submit that draft to the instructor by no later than 0900 hours two days before the defence. The draft will be returned, with suggestions for improvement by 1200 hours the following day. Students are encouraged to revise these drafts before the date of the defence.

A rubric (specific criteria for the defence) is included in your course organization package.

3. Action Memorandum (25%) – due exactly one week after the defence.

Students are strongly encouraged to revise the draft of the memorandum that they defended in light of the class discussion before it is formally evaluated. Submissions (hard copy or electronic) must reach the instructor within 7 days of the original defence.

This assignment is designed to challenge students to develop and defend practical policy options and recommendations in an academic, but yet policy-relevant historical environment. It requires clear and concise analytical and writing skills, along with an ability to construct a clear, straight-forward, and persuasive argument.

The (absolutely no more than) 6-page ( 1½ -spaced) action memorandum will be drawn largely, although not necessarily exclusively, from the course readings.

The first (cover) page will state the issue in question and list a summary of recommendations.

The remaining 5 pages will be divided into the following sections: background (1-1½ pages); options (½ page); considerations (2-2½ pages); recommendations (1 page).

An example of an action memorandum is included with this outline. A second example will be used in the first seminar discussion. Please use these examples as guides for appropriate formatting. A grading rubric for this assignment is included in your course organization package.

4. Final Examination (35%) – 18 May

The exam is intended to evaluate whether the students have understood the main issues and themes covered in the course, as well as to assess the students’ ability to apply the information and ideas that have been learned to form thoughtful and convincing arguments.

The 2-hour exam will be divided into 2 equally weighted sections. The first section will be comprised of an essay question focused on the assigned historical readings. The second section will require the students to draft an action memorandum to the current foreign minister related to a contemporary issue. A grading rubric for the essay is included in your course organization package. The grading rubric for the action memorandum will not change from the previous assignment.

Course Evaluation (summary)
Seminar Participation: 30%
Action Memorandum Defence: 10%
Action Memorandum (due 1 week after sessions 2,3,4, or 5): 25%
Final Examination (held in class on 18 May): 35%


Class Schedule

6 APRIL
APPEASEMENT AND THE PATH TO WAR

1. James Eayrs, “ ‘A Low Dishonest Decade’: Aspects of Canadian External Policy, 1931-1939,” in R. Douglas Francis and Donald B. Smith, eds, Readings in Canadian History: Post-Confederation, 5th ed. (Toronto: Harcourt and Brace Canada, 1998), 347-362.
2. Adrian W. Preston, “Canada and the Higher Direction of the Second World War, 1939-1945,” in B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock, eds, Canada’s Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1993), 98-102.
3. J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, “ ‘A Self-Evident National Duty’: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1935-1939,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 3,2 (January 1975): 212-233.
4. Angelika Sauer, “Goodwill and Profit: Mackenzie King and Canadian Appeasement,” in Norman Hillmer et al, eds, A Country of Limitations: Canada and the World in 1939 (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1996), 247-269.


13 APRIL
THE DIPLOMACY OF CONSTRAINT AND THE KOREAN WAR

1. Denis Stairs, “The Diplomacy of Constraint,” in Norman Hillmer, ed., Partners Nevertheless: Canadian-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1989), 214-226.
2. John Price, “The ‘Cat’s Paw’: Canada and the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea,” Canadian Historical Review 85,2 (June 2004): 297-300; 321-324.
3. Robert Prince, “The Limits of Constraint,” Journal of Canadian Studies 27,4 (Winter 1992-93): 129-152.
4. Timothy Andrews Sayle, “A Pattern of Constraint: Canadian-American Relations in the Early Cold War,” International Journal 62,3 (Summer 2007): 689-705.

Supplementary

Greg Donaghy, “Pacific Diplomacy: Canadian Statecraft and the Korean War, 1950-1953,” in R.W.L. Guisso and Young-sik Yoo, eds., Canada and Korea: Perspectives 2000 (Toronto: Centre for Korean Studies, University of Toronto, 2002), 81-100.


27 APRIL
THE SUEZ CRISIS AND UN DIPLOMACY

1. John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson 1949-1972 (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 121-45.
2. John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, vol. 2, 1943-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 348-70.
3. James Eayrs, “Canadian Policy and Opinion During the Suez Crisis,” International Journal 12,2 (Spring 1957): 97-108.
4. David A. Lenarcic, “Remembering History: The Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 from a Canadian Perspective,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 26,1 (Summer 1996): 26-31.

Supplementary

Michael K. Carroll, Pearson’s Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67 (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2009), 3-56.

Geoffrey A.P. Pearson, Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 137-55.

Escott Reid, Hungary and Suez: A View from New Delhi (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1986), 13-26; 133-139.


4 MAY
DIPLOMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

1. Robert W. Reford, Canada and Three Crises (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), 149-68.
2. Peyton V. Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 27-64.
3. Jocelyn Ghent-Mallet and Don Munton, “Confronting Kennedy and the Missiles in Cuba 1962,” in Don Munton and John Kirton, eds, Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1992), 78-100.

Supplementary

A. Walter Dorn and Robert Pauk, “Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Diplomatic History 33,2 (April 2009): 261-292.

Peter T. Haydon, The Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), 121-148; 176-211.

Joseph T. Jockel, Canada in NORAD 1957-2007: A History (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 54-60.

Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 335-40.


13 MAY
YSANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE THIRD OPTION

1. J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 158-62.
2. Mitchell Sharp, “Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future,” in Norman Hillmer, ed., Partners Nevertheless: Canadian-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1989), 126-143.
3. Peyton V. Lyon, “Second Thoughts on the Second Option,” International Journal 30,4 (Autumn 1975), 646-670.
4. Robert Bothwell, “‘The Canadian Connection’: Canada and Europe,” in Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, eds., Foremost Nation: Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 24-36.
5. Gilbert R. Winham, “Choice and Strategy in Continental Relations,” in W. Andrew Axline et. al., eds., Continental Community? Independence and Integration in North America (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), 228-239.

Supplementary

Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984 (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2007), 343-348.

Michael Hart, A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2002), 278-292.

Mitchell Sharp, Which Reminds Me: A Memoir (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 177-186.


18 MAY
FINAL EXAMINATION

Appendix: questions for consideration


Questions for Consideration

The following questions will focus your thinking as you attempt to analyze the provided readings and action memoranda. Depending on the topic in question, some will be more important than others. If you at any point feel like you require additional information, please contact the instructor for suggestions for additional readings and/or to answer your questions.

1. What were the principal preoccupations in the minds of the government, both domestic and external, at the time the issue arose?
2. What international organizations or alliances, countries, and domestic bodies were principally involved? What were Canada’s special relations with, and obligations to, them? And what were their interests?
3. How much information did the Canadian government have? From what sources?
4. How was the issue initially defined and interpreted? How unexpected, important, and urgent was it?
5. What had been the Canadian attitude on this kind of issue previously? Were there new factors justifying a changed position?
6. What specifically national Canadian interests were involved?
7. What actors within the government were relevant? What interpretations and interests did each have?
8. How was the issue processed within the government? What ‘decisional channels’ or deliberative mechanisms were used?
9. What conflicts arose, of what duration and intensity? Was there a conflict of political, security, and economic interests? How were the moral considerations defined and dealt with?
10. Were there, insofar as can be presumed, differences of opinion within Cabinet?
11. Were there currents of public opinion to be considered? How did special interest groups try to influence policy? How did members of parliament become involved? What role did provincial governments play and what, if any, were the special considerations imposed by a bicultural foreign policy?
12. Is there any evidence of pressure from other governments, either acceptable diplomatic representations or threats of any kind?
13. How did the government try to fend off pressures from organizations within and outside Canada? Were there efforts to lead or mislead public opinion?
14. How, if at all, did the relevant actors, interpretations, interests, and tactics change as the issue moved toward the point of final decision?
15. What were the alternatives considered and how, and on what basis, was the decision finally made?
16. What specific action(s) did the government finally take to cope with the issue under consideration?
17. Was the decision a good one? What values and interests did it support, hinder, ignore?
18. What action should have been taken as an alternative or an addition? Was this a matter on which Canada should have taken an initiative? Alone or with others and if so whom?
19. Why did the government act as it did? That is, what actors exercised predominant power or what factors were most compelling? Specifically, to what extent was Canada’s an ‘independent decision’?
20. How could a different decision have been produced? Were the factors necessary to do so under the control or influence of Canadian policymakers?
21. Why is the government’s response to this issue of particular interest from a policy and academic standpoint?